

Integrating Sun Tzu's Strategic Thought into Contemporary Nigeria's Counter Insurgency Operations Doctrine (2009–2025)

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Abstract

The persistent insurgency in Nigeria's North-East since 2009 has posed a major threat to national security, state authority, and regional stability in West Africa. Despite sustained military campaigns and substantial investment in security operations, Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have retained considerable resilience, adaptability, and operational capability. This study examines the relevance of Sun Tzu's strategic philosophy to Nigeria's counterinsurgency doctrine between 2009 and 2025. Employing a qualitative approach based on secondary data, it analyzes how Sun Tzu's principles of intelligence superiority, strategic deception, adaptability, leadership, psychological warfare, and population-centred operations could strengthen contemporary counterinsurgency efforts. The analysis indicates that, although Nigeria has achieved notable military successes, its excessive reliance on kinetic operations has constrained sustainable strategic outcomes. Integrating Sun Tzu's strategic principles into counterinsurgency doctrine could improve intelligence effectiveness, operational adaptability, civil-military relations, and strategic communication while promoting a more comprehensive response to insurgent threats. The study concludes that sustainable success against insurgent movements requires a multidimensional strategy that combines appropriately targeted military force with political legitimacy,

socioeconomic development, information dominance, and the support of affected communities. By connecting classical strategic thought with Nigeria's contemporary security challenges, this study contributes a conceptual framework for developing a more adaptive, intelligence-led, and population-centred counterinsurgency doctrine.

Keywords: Sun Tzu; Counterinsurgency; Strategic Thought; Military Doctrine; Nigeria

Introduction

The security environment of the twenty-first century differs considerably from that of previous eras. Conventional wars fought between sovereign states no longer constitute the primary threat to international peace and stability. Instead, governments increasingly confront non-traditional security challenges such as terrorism, insurgency, violent extremism, cybercrime, transnational organized crime, and hybrid warfare. These threats are often driven by non-state actors who exploit political instability, weak institutions, socio-economic inequalities, and technological advancements to challenge state authority. As a result, military establishments around the world have been compelled to reassess traditional doctrines and adopt more flexible approaches suited to irregular warfare and asymmetric conflict.

Nigeria represents one of the most significant examples of this changing security landscape. Since 2009, the country has faced a prolonged insurgency led initially by Boko Haram and later by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The conflict has caused widespread destruction across the North-East geopolitical zone, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. Beyond the direct loss of lives, the insurgency has displaced millions of people, disrupted economic activities, destroyed infrastructure, and generated one of Africa's most severe humanitarian crises.

Agricultural production has declined in many affected communities, educational institutions have been destroyed, and cross-border trade within the Lake Chad Basin has been severely disrupted. The emergence of Boko Haram cannot be explained by a single factor. Rather, it developed within a context characterized by poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, poor governance, corruption, and religious radicalization. The movement was founded by Mohammed Yusuf, who criticized the Nigerian state and advocated a strict

interpretation of Islamic teachings. Following clashes with security agencies and Yusuf's death in police custody in 2009, the group adopted increasingly violent methods. Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram transformed into a formidable insurgent organization capable of conducting suicide bombings, kidnappings, attacks on military formations, and assaults on civilian populations.

Several incidents illustrate the growing sophistication of the insurgency. Examples include the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in 2011, the attack on the Nigerian Police Force Headquarters the same year, and the abduction of more than 270 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014. These events attracted international attention and demonstrated the capacity of insurgent groups to challenge state authority and undermine public confidence in government institutions.

In response, successive Nigerian governments implemented various counterinsurgency initiatives aimed at restoring security and territorial control. Operations such as Restore Order, Lafiya Dole, and Hadin Kai were launched to dismantle insurgent networks and reclaim occupied territories. Regional cooperation through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), involving Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin Republic, further strengthened efforts to combat insurgency across the Lake Chad region. Despite these measures, Boko Haram and ISWAP have remained resilient due to their ability to adapt, exploit local grievances, and modify their operational tactics.

The persistence of insecurity despite significant military investment suggests the need for alternative strategic approaches. One perspective that offers valuable insights is the military philosophy of Sun Tzu. His classical work, *The Art of War*, emphasizes intelligence, deception, adaptability, leadership, and psychological influence as critical determinants of success in warfare. Although written over two thousand years ago, these principles continue to influence contemporary military thinking and remain highly relevant to modern counterinsurgency operations.

This study therefore examines how Sun Tzu's strategic ideas can be incorporated into Nigeria's counterinsurgency doctrine between 2009 and 2025. It argues that a greater emphasis on intelligence-driven operations, strategic communication, operational flexibility, and population-centered approaches can significantly enhance the effectiveness of Nigeria's efforts against insurgent and terrorist groups.

Conceptual Clarification

Strategic Thought

Strategic thought refers to the intellectual process through which leaders formulate and implement long-term plans designed to achieve specific political, military, economic, or security objectives. It involves assessing threats, evaluating available resources, identifying opportunities, and selecting appropriate courses of action. Strategic thought therefore serves as the bridge between national objectives and the practical measures required to achieve them. Within contemporary security studies, strategic thought extends beyond military operations. It incorporates diplomatic initiatives, economic policies, intelligence activities, information management, and psychological influence. Effective strategic thinking enables policymakers to anticipate future challenges and develop comprehensive responses before threats escalate into major crises. The strategic approaches adopted by countries such as the United States after the September 11 attacks and by Israel in its counterterrorism campaigns illustrate the importance of long-term planning and adaptive decision-making in modern security environments.

Counterinsurgency refers to the coordinated political, military, economic, social, and psychological measures employed by a government to defeat insurgent movements and restore legitimate authority. Unlike conventional warfare, where the primary objective is often the destruction of enemy forces, counterinsurgency focuses on protecting the population and winning public support. Modern counterinsurgency doctrine recognizes that insurgencies are fundamentally political struggles. Consequently, military action alone is rarely sufficient to achieve lasting success. Governments must also address governance deficits, unemployment, social exclusion, corruption, and other grievances that insurgents exploit for recruitment. The experiences of Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, and Nigeria demonstrate that successful counterinsurgency requires a combination of security operations and socio-economic interventions.

Military Doctrine

Military doctrine refers to a body of officially approved principles and guidelines that direct military planning, training, and operations. It provides a common framework for decision-making and ensures that members of the armed forces operate according to shared concepts and procedures. Doctrine serves as an important link between military

theory and practical operations. It translates abstract strategic ideas into actionable guidance for commanders and troops.

Counterinsurgency doctrine specifically addresses irregular warfare and outlines principles relating to intelligence gathering, civil-military relations, information operations, population security, and inter-agency cooperation. In Nigeria's case, counterinsurgency doctrine has evolved over time in response to changing threats posed by Boko Haram and ISWAP.

Insurgency

Insurgency is an organized and sustained effort by a group to challenge or overthrow an established authority through political mobilization, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, propaganda, and other forms of irregular conflict. Insurgents generally seek to weaken the legitimacy of the state while gaining support from segments of the population. Insurgencies often emerge where governance is weak, socio-economic inequalities are pronounced, and political grievances remain unresolved. Historical examples include the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency illustrates many of these characteristics. Through religious narratives, propaganda campaigns, and asymmetric warfare tactics, the group has attempted to challenge the authority of the Nigerian state and establish an alternative ideological order.

Major Principles of Sun Tzu's Strategic Theory and Their Relevance to Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Operations

Intelligence and Information Superiority

One of the most fundamental principles in Sun Tzu's strategic philosophy is the centrality of intelligence in warfare. Sun Tzu maintained that successful military operations depend on accurate knowledge of the enemy's intentions, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses, and patterns of behavior. According to him, commanders who possess superior information are better positioned to anticipate threats, exploit vulnerabilities, and make effective strategic decisions.⁶ Intelligence therefore serves as the foundation upon which all other military activities are built.

The relevance of this principle to Nigeria's counterinsurgency campaign cannot be overstated. Since the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency, intelligence failures have often contributed to the success of insurgent attacks. In several instances, security agencies lacked timely information regarding planned attacks, insurgent movements, recruitment activities, and logistics networks. The 2014 abduction of schoolgirls from Chibok exposed significant intelligence and coordination gaps within the national security architecture.⁷ Similarly, attacks on military formations in Borno State have frequently demonstrated the ability of insurgents to exploit weaknesses in information gathering and operational preparedness.

To address these challenges, Nigeria has invested in strengthening intelligence capabilities through the activities of agencies such as the Department of State Services, the Defence Intelligence Agency, and military intelligence units. The deployment of surveillance drones, satellite imagery, signal intelligence technologies, and intelligence fusion centres has improved situational awareness in conflict zones. Furthermore, collaboration with local vigilante groups such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has enhanced human intelligence gathering in areas where insurgents operate.⁸ Applying Sun Tzu's principle of intelligence superiority therefore requires a more coordinated intelligence framework capable of facilitating real-time information exchange among all relevant stakeholders. Enhanced intelligence capabilities would improve target identification, disrupt insurgent logistics, and reduce civilian casualties during military operations.

Strategic Deception

Another important component of Sun Tzu's strategic philosophy is deception. Sun Tzu famously argued that all warfare is based on deception and that military forces should seek to influence enemy perceptions in ways that produce strategic advantages. Through concealment, misinformation, surprise actions, and psychological manipulation, commanders can create uncertainty and confusion within enemy ranks while preserving their own operational security.

Nigeria's security forces have occasionally employed deception strategies during operations against Boko Haram and ISWAP. These measures have included surprise offensives, covert intelligence operations, and the use of misinformation to conceal troop movements. Such approaches have enabled security forces to target insurgent camps and eliminate key commanders. However, the application of strategic deception remains

relatively limited compared to its potential value within broader counterinsurgency doctrine. A more systematic integration of deception strategies could involve cyber operations, misinformation campaigns targeting insurgent communication networks, and covert activities aimed at creating divisions within insurgent ranks. By increasing uncertainty among insurgent leaders, security agencies can reduce the effectiveness of enemy planning and weaken operational cohesion.

Flexibility and Adaptability

Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of flexibility in responding to changing battlefield conditions. He warned against rigid adherence to predetermine plans and argued that successful commanders must continuously adjust their strategies to evolving circumstances. This principle is particularly relevant to counterinsurgency operations because insurgent organizations are highly adaptive and constantly modify their tactics in response to government actions.

The evolution of Boko Haram illustrates the importance of strategic adaptability. During its early years, the group relied heavily on direct attacks against government institutions and security formations. Between 2013 and 2015, Boko Haram shifted toward territorial occupation and attempted to establish control over several local government areas in northeastern Nigeria. Following sustained military pressure, the group abandoned large-scale territorial control and adopted guerrilla tactics, including ambushes, suicide bombings, kidnappings, and improvised explosive device attacks. Adaptability also extends to the use of technology. Modern counterinsurgency increasingly relies on artificial intelligence, surveillance systems, data analytics, cyber capabilities, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Integrating these technologies into operational planning can significantly enhance Nigeria's ability to monitor insurgent activities and respond proactively to evolving security challenges.

Psychological Warfare

Sun Tzu recognized that warfare involves not only physical confrontation but also the contest for hearts, minds, and perceptions. He argued that weakening an adversary's morale and undermining their will to fight can be more effective than direct military engagement. Consequently, psychological warfare occupies a central position within his strategic framework.

In the context of Nigeria's insurgency, psychological warfare is particularly important because Boko Haram and ISWAP rely heavily on propaganda and ideological messaging. Through videos, social media platforms, religious narratives, and misinformation campaigns, these groups seek to recruit followers, intimidate communities, and undermine confidence in government institutions.

The kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls and subsequent media campaigns demonstrated how insurgent organizations can use psychological tactics to generate fear and attract international attention. Similarly, attacks on military bases are often publicized by insurgents to project strength and demoralize security personnel. Furthermore, psychological operations aimed at encouraging defections from insurgent groups have yielded positive results. Programmes such as Operation Safe Corridor demonstrate how non-kinetic measures can complement military operations by providing pathways for rehabilitation and reintegration.

Leadership and Unity of Command

Leadership constitutes another critical pillar of Sun Tzu's strategic philosophy. According to Sun Tzu, effective leaders possess wisdom, integrity, courage, discipline, and the ability to inspire confidence among their followers. Strong leadership promotes unity of effort, enhances organizational cohesion, and improves operational effectiveness.

Nigeria's counterinsurgency experience highlights the importance of leadership at both strategic and operational levels. Successful military campaigns have often been associated with improved coordination among commanders, enhanced troop morale, and effective resource management. Conversely, leadership deficiencies have sometimes contributed to operational setbacks, logistical challenges, and reduced effectiveness in the field. Sun Tzu's emphasis on unity of command is equally relevant. Counterinsurgency operations involve multiple actors, including the armed forces, intelligence agencies, police organizations, immigration authorities, customs services, and civil authorities. Effective coordination among these institutions is essential for achieving strategic objectives.

Population-Centred Security

A final principle of Sun Tzu's strategic thought relates to the importance of legitimacy and public support. Although Sun Tzu did not use the modern term "population-centred security," his writings emphasize the significance of maintaining public confidence and minimizing unnecessary hardship during conflict. Contemporary

counterinsurgency doctrine similarly recognizes that securing the population is often more important than simply eliminating enemy fighters.

The Boko Haram insurgency demonstrates the importance of this principle. Communities experiencing poverty, unemployment, inadequate education, and weak governance are often more vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Insurgent groups exploit these grievances by presenting themselves as alternatives to existing political structures.

Relevance of Sun Tzu's Strategic Theory to Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Operations

Sun Tzu's strategic theory remains highly relevant to contemporary security operations, particularly in the context of counterinsurgency campaigns. Although *The Art of War* was written over two thousand years ago, many of its principles continue to influence military planning, intelligence gathering, psychological operations, and conflict management across the world.

One of Sun Tzu's most important principles is the emphasis on knowledge and intelligence. He argued that commanders who possess accurate information about their enemies are more likely to achieve victory.¹⁹ In Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations, intelligence gathering has become a critical component of military success. Security agencies such as the Department of State Services (DSS), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and military intelligence units rely on surveillance, informants, reconnaissance missions, and technological tools to monitor insurgent activities.

Another principle advanced by Sun Tzu is the importance of understanding both the enemy and oneself. According to him, a commander who understands the strengths and weaknesses of both sides will be better positioned to achieve success on the battlefield.²⁰ This principle is particularly relevant in Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations because insurgent groups often employ unconventional tactics such as ambushes, suicide attacks, kidnappings, and guerrilla warfare. Understanding the motivations, recruitment strategies, operational methods, and sources of support available to insurgents allows security agencies to develop more effective responses.

Sun Tzu also emphasized the importance of winning without fighting whenever possible. Rather than relying exclusively on military force, he advocated the use of

diplomacy, persuasion, deception, and strategic influence to weaken opponents.²¹ This idea aligns closely with modern counterinsurgency strategies that combine military action with political, economic, and social measures. In Nigeria, the government has complemented military operations with deradicalization initiatives, rehabilitation programmes, and community engagement efforts. Programmes designed to reintegrate repentant insurgents into society reflect Sun Tzu's belief that conflict can sometimes be resolved through non-violent approaches rather than prolonged warfare.

The principle of flexibility is another aspect of Sun Tzu's theory that is highly applicable to Nigeria's security environment. Sun Tzu argued that military leaders must adapt their strategies to changing circumstances rather than relying on rigid plans. Insurgent groups frequently change tactics, relocate their operational bases, and exploit emerging opportunities. Consequently, Nigerian security forces have had to adjust their operational methods over time.

Sun Tzu further stressed the significance of terrain and environmental awareness in warfare. He maintained that commanders who understand the physical environment gain a strategic advantage over their opponents. This principle has particular relevance in Northeastern Nigeria, where insurgents often exploit difficult terrains such as the Sambisa Forest, the Mandara Mountains, and remote border communities. Knowledge of these environments has helped security forces conduct targeted operations and disrupt insurgent movements. Local vigilante groups and community-based security networks have also contributed valuable geographical knowledge that supports military operations. Another relevant principle is the importance of maintaining the support of the population. Sun Tzu believed that successful military campaigns depend not only on armed force but also on the loyalty and cooperation of the people. Contemporary counterinsurgency theory similarly recognizes that public support is essential for long-term success.

In Nigeria, civilian cooperation has provided intelligence, facilitated community policing initiatives, and strengthened efforts to identify insurgent collaborators. Programmes aimed at winning the trust of local communities have therefore become an important aspect of counterinsurgency operations.

Challenges in Integrating Sun Tzu's Strategic Theory to Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Operations

Despite its relevance, the application of Sun Tzu's strategic theory to Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations faces several challenges.

- i. One major challenge is inadequate intelligence coordination among security agencies. Although intelligence remains central to Sun Tzu's strategic thinking, institutional rivalry and poor information sharing sometimes reduce operational effectiveness. Delays in intelligence dissemination may hinder timely responses to insurgent activities and limit the ability of security forces to prevent attacks.
- ii. Another challenge is the complex nature of contemporary insurgency. Unlike conventional warfare, insurgent groups operate within civilian populations and often avoid direct confrontation with military forces. This makes it difficult to identify combatants, gather reliable intelligence, and conduct operations without affecting innocent civilians.
- iii. Corruption and inadequate resource allocation also undermine the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. Cases involving mismanagement of defence funds, procurement irregularities, and logistical deficiencies have occasionally weakened operational capacity. These challenges reduce the ability of security institutions to implement strategic principles effectively.
- iv. Difficult geographical conditions present another obstacle. Large portions of Northeastern Nigeria consist of forests, mountains, and remote settlements with limited infrastructure. Insurgents often exploit these conditions to evade security forces and establish operational bases. While Sun Tzu emphasized environmental awareness, modern insurgents frequently combine geographical advantages with advanced communication technologies, creating additional security challenges.
- v. The persistence of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and social inequality also complicates counterinsurgency efforts. These socio-economic conditions can create vulnerabilities that extremist groups exploit for recruitment purposes. Consequently, military operations alone cannot eliminate insurgency. Sustainable solutions require comprehensive approaches that address underlying social and economic grievances.

- vi. Political interference and inconsistencies in policy implementation further hinder effective counterinsurgency operations. Changes in political priorities, leadership transitions, and competing interests sometimes affect the continuity of security strategies.

Conclusion

Sun Tzu's strategic theory remains one of the most influential frameworks in the study of warfare and security management. Although developed in ancient China, its principles continue to provide valuable insights for addressing contemporary security challenges. The emphasis on intelligence gathering, strategic planning, flexibility, environmental awareness, effective leadership, deception, and popular support offers useful lessons for Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations. Nigeria's experience in combating Boko Haram and other insurgent groups demonstrates the continuing relevance of Sun Tzu's ideas. Intelligence-driven operations, community engagement, counter-radicalization programmes, and adaptive military strategies reflect many of the principles contained in *The Art of War*. The integration of military, political, social, and psychological approaches also aligns with Sun Tzu's belief that victory is achieved through comprehensive strategy rather than force alone.

However, the successful application of Sun Tzu's strategic theory requires overcoming significant challenges. Problems such as inadequate intelligence coordination, corruption, socio-economic inequalities, difficult terrain, human rights concerns, and political interference continue to affect the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations. Addressing these issues is essential for improving national security outcomes and achieving sustainable peace. Ultimately, the study concludes that Sun Tzu's strategic theory provides a valuable analytical framework for understanding and improving Nigeria's counterinsurgency efforts. While the nature of warfare has evolved significantly since Sun Tzu's time, the fundamental principles of strategy, intelligence, adaptability, and leadership remain relevant. By incorporating these principles into security planning and implementation, Nigeria can strengthen its capacity to confront insurgency and enhance national stability.

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- The Ezeh entry originally omitted Akogwu, while the Onuoha entry contained the wrong year, volume, issue, and pages. The journal's own page confirms all three Ezeh article authors and pages.
- The official records identify Pérouse de Montclos as the book's editor, Omeni's book as a 2017 publication with a longer subtitle, Williams's work as a second—not third—

edition, and Zenn's 2020 book under a different title. [African Studies Centre, University of St Andrews](#), [Polity](#), [Lynne Rienner Publishers](#).

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