

## The Intricate Dynamics of Democratic Crises in Least Developed Countries

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### Abstract

This paper explores how the economic crisis, lack of education, political corruption, and Western intervention contribute to declines in overall democratization in developing or LDC nations. Using a comparative analysis of case studies from various regions, the study analyzes cross-cutting trends and deviations in democratic backsliding. This paper suggests how economic instability either originates in or feeds resource scarcity and instability in local and world markets, resulting in a downward spiral of poverty, unemployment, and social unrest that can destroy public confidence in democratic institutions. Keeping the access to education to the masses low, with the representatives disengaging from their voters, makes the individuals vulnerable and weak, making democracy weak. One example is political corruption, which abuses power for personal gain, undermining public trust and confidence in democratic governance. The trajectory where this was at that point could be influenced by external actors, like foreign aid or structural adjustment

programs from international financial institutions, that perpetuate dependency and, if the terms of those loans are not met, impose austerity packages that shrink democracy. This paper contributes to the academic literature on LDCs challenged by crisis redeems in democracies by highlighting processes over multiple years that determine crises as the formation of social, economic, political, or external tensions involving three interconnected levels of operations of tensions: social, economic, and political; political and external; and financial and external. Such insights illustrate the urgency for holistic solutions that confront the causes of democratic deterioration and enable the US to build sustained support that is successful against those most at risk.

**Keywords:** Democratic Backsliding, Economic Instability, Least Developed Countries, Political Corruption, Public Trust, Western Intervention

## INTRODUCTION

Democratization in LDCs is a complex issue involving the potential risks of challenges to democratic principles and institutions' emergence and consolidation. Indeed, poor democratic performance in some states is often accompanied by economic fragility, social inequality, political instability, and the erosion of democratic values in others. Dreams for democracy are replete with potential, only to be overshadowed by economic turmoil, which is endemic to many LDC groups. Resource scarcity, tightening market conditions, and the inability of governments to respond effectively to financial crises, ultimately leading to mass poverty, unemployment, and social unrest, contribute to the weakening of democratic processes.

This can make it harder for citizens to engage in the democratic process fully. Without education for civic competence, citizens will be less able to expand their understanding of rights and responsibilities or critically reflect on civic issues to participate meaningfully in civic life. Non-engaged citizenry can undermine the democratic structure, creating an environment that welcomes corruption and anti-democratic tendencies. It is widely accepted that political corruption is one of the biggest problems befalling most LDCs, as it is the toxin that works its way to the very heart of democracy and its legitimacy. When those in charge abuse their power to line their pockets at the expense of the people they

govern, they betray the public trust and plant the seeds of disaffection with the institutions of democracy, breeding the cycle of corruption and disorder.

The democracy of LDCs is weakened at the external level by high market-class incentives. While foreign assistance might provide sorely needed resources for development and stability, it could also create dependencies, undermine local ownership, and perpetuate a permanent service cycle. Additionally, the conditionality of international financial institutions has sometimes resulted in austerity measures that may exacerbate rather than alleviate economic crises and social tensions, undermining democratic governance. As such, what follows is a more granular consideration of the various internal and external factors that should be weighed in conjunction with one another as part of a deliberate strategy to safeguard democracy within LDCs, leaving open the potential for divergence (if successful) and thus culminating in a holistic framework for the design of concrete democratization initiatives that reflect these characteristics and principles. This leaves us with the theme for this issue of the LDC's Focus on building solutions to the root causes of the democratic crises we have witnessed in some LDCs, ultimately bringing us to the objective of sustainable development and democratic consolidation of the most vulnerable nations.

## **METHODS**

This paper uses a comparative case study design to study the nature and causes of democratic crises among Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Through a case study analysis of four geographical regions, including Sub-Saharan Africa (Zimbabwe), Southern Asia (Nepal), Latin America (Venezuela), and Southeast Asia (Myanmar), the research highlights the commonalities as well as differences in the phenomenon of democratic decline.

The data-analyzing method involved extensive analysis of existing literature, reports, and policy documents provided by international agencies to understand the interplay of factors contributing to democratic crises in LDCs. The selection of case studies allowed for a broad spectrum of LDCs, enabling a comparison of different contexts and trajectories of democratic development.

Data collection methods include document studies (e.g., government and international organization reports or publications and academic studies) and qualitative content analyses of secondary sources (e.g., news articles, expert opinions, historical accounts) to provide

rich contextual information for each case study. In doing so, the comparative analysis seeks to identify the relevant factors that might underlie democratic crises- their correlations, such as the role of economic instability, education, political corruption, and outside factors and the interaction between these mechanisms in the context of an LDC subject.

This study contributes to analyzing democratic crises in LDCs by capturing that a panaceæ response solution will not ensure democratic consolidation and resilience, nor will it prevail in potentially volatile contexts.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This concern of LDCs was juxtaposed, and their implications embedded therein are a seeable manifestation of the countervailing directions in global geo-strategic politics as it seeks to counter democratic consolidation. Such countries, characterized by a diversity of endemics, become mired in a tangle of economic precarity, social inequality, and political instability that could drive a gradual erosion of democratic values and institutions (Bi, 2024, pp. 327–357; Ronconi & Raphael, 2024). Economic instability constantly complicates the path toward democracy among the many LDCs. Limited resources and unstable market systems can increase poverty rates and the propensity for unemployment and civil unrest, making these conditions conducive to political instability (Nguyen & Le, 2024). The erosion of public trust caused by the government's deficits in effectively managing economic crises could increase resentment from democratic backgrounds, providing ground for authoritarian alternatives to thrust their agendas (Lachapelle & Hellmeier, 2024, pp. 123-143).

In the LDCs, performance in all these aspects has little interaction and no good education. Citizens who are not educated critically and the innate rights and responsibilities of citizens will not perceive the need to oversee government and will be more easily manipulated. This disengagement from civic life can erode democratic systems, making them more susceptible to corruption and authoritarianism (Sobhy, 2024, pp. 1–23).

Corruption, a common problem in LDCs, is a damaging trait that eats away at the core of democracy. When leaders and public officials misuse their positions for personal gain, they violate public trust and undermine citizens' confidence in democratic institutions (Kamara et al., 2024, pp. 121-132). This creates a vicious cycle of corruption and instability as citizens lose trust in a system that appears to be rigged.

In addition, a more complex explanation that includes forces outside each particular contributes to the slow rate of democratic transitions in the LDCs, including international aid, free trade agreements, and regional tensions and wars. This type of assistance could fill the vast gaps in resources and leverage needed to gain maturity and stability; it could also turn to dependencies within the country that could work against local ownership, repeating other cycles of dependency (Wood, 2024). Moreover, competition governed by international financial institution policies can lead to a downward “race to the bottom” for social and labor rights that may foster dissent and threaten democratic governance.

This jigsaw of forces makes the slope to democracy in LDCs an enjoyable tightrope walk. It means grappling with the urgent issues of economic volatility, educational disparities, political corruption, and the more challenging terrain of international relations and global economic forces.

Understanding the complexity of democratic problems in LDCs is essential for devising solutions. This suggests recognizing the concurrent challenges presented by divisive economic, social, political, and foreign elements and formulating remedies that comprehensively tackle the underlying causes of democratic deterioration. As our argument above indicates, overarching efforts should constitute the new thread of the UN Secretary-General's promotion of resilient, democratic institutions and sustainable development in fragile countries (Poyet et al., 2024, pp. 246–261).

Democratic crises of a less developed country (LDC) are issues of great concern since they can severely disrupt the stability and development of those nations. Understanding is essential for many reasons. First, many PMAs struggle with economic instability. Weak economies can contribute to high unemployment, stagnant wages, and inflation. These issues usually lead to mistrust in the government, which attacks democracy. Secondly, education represents a significant factor in the weakness of democratic values and practices. It is far less clear how literate citizens in PMAs cannot read and write and, hence, are unaware of their rights and duties. Citizens with less education may also be less willing to challenge corruption or hold leaders accountable.”

Another major driver of the democracy crisis in the PMA is political corruption. The private profits leaders and government officials can rake in with their power, which is so much more efficient and cheaply earned that it has corroded public trust in political systems. Such corruption can create a vicious circle where the public’s disillusionment with

democracy leads to either apathy or bloody civil disorder. These crises are about external factors as well. PMs are net receivers of foreign aid and capital, creating dependencies that can restrict their political and economic independence. Corrupt local officials sometimes serve foreign interests and interfere in local politics. It means outside pressure to thwart democratic initiatives and trail off instability.

Various interrelated factors determine democracy in LDC. Economic woes, poverty, educational deprivation, political corruption, and outside meddling would be the plight of the nations. Recognizing such drivers is crucial to positioning unique policy pathways to advance democracy and better governance in LDC. The nexus between economic fragility and democratic vulnerability is well-established, particularly in less developed countries (LDC). When the economy comes under extreme strain on its resources, democratic processes weaken. Their political stability can be highly eventful in terms of economic performance. Citizens may claim that if the finances are low, they goad their states, at which point protests or violence ensues. There is a well-known link between recession and political unrest. There is some evidence that citizens whose jobs are lost or whose costs lose faith in government performance. That can generate demands for change, which creates political instability.

In this regard, Pitlik (2024) shows that preserving democratic institutions in LDCs is conditioned on economic freedom. The better economies work, the more freedom and better governance citizens enjoy. However, those freedoms can evaporate in times of financial distress. They can take the authoritarian steps needed to solve the problems and re-enable stability; otherwise, the government can not do anything. The resulting turmoil threatens democratic ideals and institutions, creating a positive feedback loop of disorder.

In another analysis that conveys how citizens care about their leaders' performance, Paldam (2024) points out that citizens also care about their leaders' economic performance. Typically, leaders receive public support, for the most part. However, leaders are left guilty of their mistakes when the economy falters. Overnight, this shift in broad consensus can delegitimize democracies. Citizens may begin to think of their leaders not as embodiments of their interests but as obstacles to progress. This tears at the fraying social bonds that have made democratic governance possible.

High unemployment rates and widespread impoverishment (with these lockdowns) are dangerous to social stability. In LDC, where so many teeter on a knife edge of survival, any

economic recession breeds widespread despair. Civil ruptures may follow, giving citizens pause to question whether democratic governance can deliver under these circumstances. When protests grow and multiply, a government can respond violently, and citizens can lose faith in its democratic institutions.

While external factors are mainly outside the scope of the economic dimensions of democratic crisis analysis, they are vital for the bigger picture. LDC, therefore, depends on foreign assistance and investment, and this relative poverty can change with the world economy. However, this is not happening now in this crisis, a time when a country whose assistance would be of no redemptive value needs the most help right now in a time of great necessity, taking a nose-dive into a far more intractable economic puzzle fuelled by what some would call top-down insecurity marinated in a broth of national vexations. There is documentation of such dependence on foreign flows, making democratic institutions vulnerable as foreign financial shocks have the potential to destabilize brittle regimes.

Democratic aims become shortsighted as an unstable economy brings constant scratch for short-lived survival. In precarious PMAs, governments can focus on the short term, sometimes jeopardizing democratic governance. This leads to a situation where the institutions that could check representatives from becoming co-opted resist requiring changes for or her ability to engage in healthy democratic interchange as the next administration turns its energies to accountability and openness to a citizenry whose needs have become urgent in terms of the economy.

Economic instability is essential to creating democratic crises in developing countries. The waxing and waning of financial performance, therefore, erodes democratic institutions, which leads governments to respond through political upheaval, loss of legitimacy, and authoritarianism. This nuanced relationship is essential for understanding those countries' complicated causes of democratic crises. It points out how crucial economic stability is for growth and the development of democratic values and institutions. Education is critical in forming democratic governance, particularly in less developed countries (LDC). Low levels of education also commonly correlate with low levels of civic commitment and awareness for the population in most PMAs. When people are not provided with a quality education, they will be ill-equipped to socialize with their rights and responsibilities as citizens. As Sobhy (2024) points out, an uneducated population can engage less in democratic actions

(i.e., voting or holding leaders to responsibility). This lack of participation can erode democratic values and institutions, making it easier for authoritarian forces to gain power.

Further, differences in education can increase wedges in society, such as along socioeconomic lines (Claassen et al., 2024). This contributes to feelings of alienation and denial of rights of marginalized groups, arguing that a lack of access to education restricts individual opportunities and reinforces divisions between groups with unequal educational access. If they are deprived of quality education, it will also be challenging to gain knowledge about democratic values and the need to partake in the government process. This self-reinforcing cycle is a recipe for increasing democratic stagnation and inertia, increasing the risk of political instability.

Furthermore, by championing deposit education, the educators who do so contribute to a systemic lack of critical consciousness, which undermines one's commitment to the tenets of democracy. Citizens can accept information at face value and not question the validity of the presented information because they have not been conditioned to think analytically. Foreign political elites or entities seeking to interfere in the democratic process can easily exploit this exposure and vulnerability to manipulation. If education is not prioritized, the citizens fall prey to populist rhetoric or incorrect information, whittling away their potential to contribute meaningfully to the functioning of the democratic process.

It is true, however, that education is not only about information intimately linked to democracy but includes a larger sense of civic education. Civic education is designed to teach students about democratic values, social responsibility, and participation in civic life. This is important because, without this education, citizens have difficulty understanding how their government operates, which leads to apathy and eventual disappointment. The worry is that a downward spiral of dimming democratic commitment will ensue as backers of democracy conclude that their voice matters little. People will find themselves entirely disengaged from the system.

Contextual factors also play an essential role in how educational systems are structured in LDCs. Colonial legacies in many countries disrupted traditional education, and those gaps remain. This legacy of disadvantage compounds current inequalities in education that weaken democratic governance. This means there is little ground for democratic habits to develop, so society cannot build strong democratic institutions because they have not been invested in education or information systems.

The relationship between education and democracy is complex and multidimensional. Low education is positively associated with decreased civic engagement in some lesser-developed countries. Unfortunately, educational disparities can create significant impediments to participation. It means systematic strategies to transform educational systems must persist so that citizens have the knowledge and resources to participate productively with their government. These issues must be confronted to cultivate resilience and strength in the PMA democratic culture. Among the LDCs, political corruption is a big challenge to the very foundation of its democratic institutions. Corruption occurs when the powers wield their power for self-interest, allowing high-handed pillaging of public resources, bribery, and embezzlement. Those things are free from the government by citizens' torching distrust, making democracy challenging to flourish. Corruption and the relationship between poor democratic institutions are most evident in the case of many LDCs. In some parts of West Africa, this is so widespread that empirical analysis has uncovered the embedding of corrupt practices into political and social life (Kamara et al., 2024, pp. 121-132).

West African countries such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone exhibit the clearest examples of how corruption can manifest within governance. In Nigeria, rampant corruption consumed massive amounts of public money that could have gone to development, healthcare, and education. Many government citizens trust democracy to provide essential services, and deviation from these funds would rob this ability as employees' wealth is starkly juxtaposed with the citizenry's economic challenges and deprivation. At the same time, the 'wealthy' workers are free to roam buildings. It can create political apathy or politicizing, increasing the region's destabilization (Kamara et al., 2024, pp. 121-132).

Sierra Leone offers another perspective on the impact of corruption. During and after his civil war, the country fought with corrupt leadership that ignored the needs of its people. Corruption at various levels of government led to the location of help and resources, which could have been used to rebuild the nation. Lack of responsibility among leaders caused a decline in public trust and participation in governance. As a result, the relationship between the state and its citizens weakened, and the necessary basis for a healthy democracy was eroded (Kamara et al., 2024, pp. 121-132).

The implications of political corruption extend beyond the erosion of trust; They also significantly prevent development progress. Corruption can result in inefficiencies in the

public and private sectors. Development projects may take longer to complete or never reach a conclusion, impacting infrastructure and essential services. When public funds are not effectively used, it becomes challenging to achieve economic growth, which is vital to stability and development. Lachapelle and Hellmeier (2024) argue that corruption removes foreign investment, creates a volatile business environment, and further discourages local entrepreneurship. Without investment and a healthy economy, the chances of the general public climbing the economic ladder as living conditions improve will diminish.

Corruption is poisoning education, too. In many LDCs, the funds allocated to education for constructing schools or training teachers are often hijacked. This mismanagement of the resources leads to ineffective educational outcomes, creating a cycle of poverty and political apathy in their constituents. Corrupt leaders can go without challenge and accountability if citizens do not have the education to understand their rights and obligations. Consequently, the link between inequalities in schooling and malfeasance is critical for curbing progress toward democracy in these nations.

Politics and corruption in LDCs for the issue of the(stills) are taking and not literally(bodily) concretely in strongly conflicting with the governance and make social development and improvement extremely difficult. Corruption problems in countries like West Africa focused on this cyclical cycle of lack of trust and economic downturn, undermining democratic institutions that have hampered good governance and social development. These features become essential through influencing forces from outside to shape the democratic procedures in LDC. One of these influences, foreign aid and the policies of international financial institutions (IFIs), frequently have a fraught relationship with democracy. On the one hand, foreign aid can help a nation with what is needed for development, education, and political stability. All these elements are crucial for democratic governance. For example, the Marshall Plan provided broad help to Western European countries after World War II. This help helped rebuild economies, promoting stability and encouraging democratic governance in nations devastated by war (Wood, 2024). The expectation was that the strongest economies and stable governments would naturally lead to prosperous democracies.

However, the impact of foreign aid is not always positive. In many PMAs, help can inadvertently encourage dependence instead of self-sufficiency, which leads to a weakened state capacity. When governments depend too much on foreign assistance, they can be less

responsible to their citizens. This situation can see political leaders prioritize foreign donors' demands on their people's needs and desires, thus undermining democratic processes (Rutar, 2024, pp. 1–24). For example, in several African nations, continuous external financing has weakened institutions, caused corruption, and caused a lack of political will to undertake the necessary reforms. In these contexts, foreign aid creates a paradox in which the mechanisms destined to promote democracy can perpetuate authoritarian practices.

These factors also impact international financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions tend to push for economic policies often contradictory to the democratic aspirations of the LDC. Structural adjustment programs can lead to austerity measures that limit government spending on public services, including Education and medical care, illustrating the cake-setting mentioned above. This causes social chaos and dissatisfaction, which threaten the very foundations of democracy as citizens lose faith in their rulers (Wood, 2024). However, the historical parallels drawn with the Marshall Plan highlight the thin line between delivering desperately needed assistance and ensuring that such aid does not erode local governance or beget autocratic regimes.

Foreign assistance may be the proper venue for growing and facilitating the PMA course and guided at a snail's pace. Previous experiences with international assistance have shown that if mismanaged, foreign aid can have unintended consequences that undermine the functioning of democratic governance. It must treat this as a building block to create a strong foundation that ensures foreign influence is additive, not subtractive, to our democracy. By critically engaging with these tendencies, policymakers could do a better job of reconciling foreign aid with the authentic democratic growth necessary in these countries, creating both the accountability and the oversight that can strengthen democracy along those lines. Globalization and market forces are the other main drivers that shape the democratic environment. As countries become increasingly integrated into the global economy, they face opportunities and challenges that may affect their democratic institutions. A critical characteristic of this relationship is how the election's local and international financial responses can bolster or destroy democratic processes.

PMAs can have a volatile economic landscape regarding a country's election, substantially impacting its financial stability. For instance, a new leader coming on board with policies

seen as prejudicial to foreign investment could also see a quick outflow of funds and assets. Hence, economic disorders will prosper, allowing the ground of political instability to flow. Democratic institutions tend to weaken during periods of financial fragility, given what can happen to citizens in the political process if their economic conditions worsen (Cunha, 2024).

The smother-him-with-a-cuddly-blanket phenomenon seen with President Trump is wrapped in the ideologies of free-market capitalism that extend to the processes of democratic governance. This can happen across many LDCs; there is quite a focus on liberalizing the economy and outsourcing import restrictions to encourage foreign investment, which tends to go to where returns are higher, and therefore, also in some LDCs. The concentration of the economic benefits in the hands of a few can result in chronic underfunding of social services: education, health care, and the like functioning properly; a mixed market economy yields both benefits and costs. This means many in society are marginalized and feel alienated from the democratic process, believing that their voice will remain unregarded in a system that croons to the wealthy elite. This prioritization can erode the very foundations of democracy and cause crises when citizens do not feel represented.

Moreover, globalization frequently brings external factors that can exacerbate the democratic environment within PMA. International entities, such as corporations, can lobby local governments and implement policies beneficial to their market interests while no consideration is given to the needs of the citizens. This results in political corruption as leaders pledge allegiance to foreign interests over that of their people. This leaves the government as the absolute power, separating it from the people, one of the causes of the deepening of the democratic crisis.

This must be read with the role of international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Less than this would be acceptable during the political transition period to help fund PMAs. However, that sense of order often comes at the expense of democratic ideals. Money is conditioned on austerity policies that slash vital social services, breeding social disruption. However, when citizens get fed up with these policies not working out, it can shake confidence in democratic processes, leading to more serious symptoms of governance problems.

Digital globalization has created new flows of information and disinformation. On the one hand, social media can empower citizens, allowing them to share information and mobilize as a group. On the other hand, though, it can spread false narratives that erode trust in democratic institutions. In PMAs, where education is often in short supply, the consequences of disinformation can be dire, creating havoc at the polls and in other significant democratic activities.

Hence, globalization and market forces entangled work to pull both untoward cardinal directions of the PMA democratic climate. Boundary conditions, weighty economics, and the perfidies of market capitalism come together to place the playing field on which democratic institutions may flourish or fade. Understanding these dynamics is essential for planning responses to the current global contestation around strengthening local democracies. Many of the LDCs face this as one of their most serious challenges. It has profound environmental ramifications, impacting political stability, governance, etc. With climate change worsening and LDCs facing already catastrophic climatic events, droughts, floods, and storms that can destroy livelihoods and disrupt communities, their governments have to plan more and more for states of affairs that leave them untenable. An example includes food scarcity, as the farmers cannot farm due to climatic patterns, resulting in hunger and poverty. Such a situation may raise social tensions due to competition among individuals for scarce resources (Rodríguez & Carril, 2024), leading to civil discord or civil war.

Environmental pressures can also weaken government institutions essential for maintaining order and promoting democracy. Many PMAs are already fighting against inefficiency and corruption in governments. During climate crises, authorities may be unable (or ill-resourced) to respond. Such a failure results in lost public confidence and trust in political leaders. This type of abandonment by their leaders creates a sense of disappointment in democratic processes, expanding the reach of anti-democratic measures as governments act more frequently with authoritarian practices to maintain control in times of crisis (Saha, 2024, pp. 91–120).

Something else that matters is that many LDCs depend on natural resources for economic growth. Climate change threatens these resources while further developing economic instability. When a negative financial shock hits, the state's capacity to deliver services is cut down even more, whether in education, medical care, or infrastructure. This can have a

cascading effect, leading to civil protests or movements against the government, which disrupts the very fabric of democratic governance and leads to more discontent amongst the general public. Such demonstrations are, at times, violently suppressed, which leads to worsening cycles of fear and repression that result in being further corrosive of democratic norms and principles.

External forces have used climate change to further their interests and shape LDC. The wealthier nations tend to be the biggest polluters of the forces behind climate change, but they also have far greater resources to deal with its impact. In contrast, PMA rarely formulates sound mitigation or adaptation policies. Such a disparity can cultivate dependence on foreign aid and loans and force governments to shape their policy to the desires of external donors rather than their constituents. Such pressure creates political instability because governments serve not the needs of their democratic system but the demands of outsiders.

It is a troubling crossroads between climate change and democratic stability in LDC. The upshot is more political instability, more unfettered wealth accumulation at the top, and more urbanization and megacities, which will also be the price to the environment. A multi-faceted approach is required that addresses climate change and the pathogenic root causes of democratic destruction and, in addition, provides a public health bulwark against the approaching cyclones of environmental threats. It can analyze publicized permutations and cycles to study the democracy crisis in LDC. These vignettes illustrate a complex set of interrelated forces, from material precarity to inadequate education, political corruption, and external influences that combined drive democracy's decline.

Zimbabwe is a case study in sub-Saharan Africa. Zimbabwe had a solid agricultural base but has faced crippling economic problems since the late 1990s. Hyperinflation, unemployment, and corruption have ravaged its economy, and democratic governance has shattered. Ruling by Gramophone under Robert Mugabe, for example, the ruling party used state mechanisms to manage and stifle opposition parties and suppress freedom of speech. Since most individuals working within the system have been conditioned to think accordingly, corruption has run rampant, and societal architecture has blocked foreign influences from nature into your political sphere.

In contrast, Nepal is in southern Asia. Nepal became a federal democratic republic in 2008 after decades of civil conflicts and political disorders. However, political corruption and

weak institutions advance. Even as the economy grew in a particular way, the benefits of that growth were not evenly distributed, which fueled widespread discontent. Many citizens cannot make leaders accountable due to the absence of quality education, leaving it a prominent barrier. Furthermore, the political dynamics within Nepal have been significantly shaped by the geopolitics of neighboring India and China, which has often stifled genuine efforts at adopting actual democratic governance. This comparison with Zimbabwe shows how similar problems can result in different political outcomes.

When discussing Latin America, the topic of Venezuela often arises. The former obsessed over Prospero, once Venezuela was a land of oil and, subsequently, its economy fell into a humanitarian crisis. Since, through the hands (the reins) of Hugo Chávez and later Nicolás Maduro, the country's management went from poverty to poverty. Democracy is a far-off fantasy; the elections are rigged, and your political enemies sit in prison. Civil society lacks the desire or ability to demand change because it relies on the government to fulfill its basic needs, which gives the government inordinate amounts of power. External actors, most notably Russia and Cuba, have generally propped up the Maduro regime, which illustrates how the LDCs are impacted by external actor involvement affecting democratization in LDCs.

Myanmar is another example of democratic backsliding in Southeast Asia. The military coup of 2021 brought progress to a halt after a brief experiment with democracy that had begun in 2011. The economy, heavily supported by military-run enterprises, had encountered serious difficulties that stoked civilian unrest. Spread of disinformation to the political space means that it can move very quickly, and this can blur the lines of citizens' response to political wool since many people have an inferior political education, especially those living on the outskirts of the country. The regional context shaping Myanmar's democratic challenges has to be considered, including its ties with China and the West. While there are nuances in each of these contexts, what usually happens amid economic downturns, corruption, and foreign actors looks familiar: the forces at play ultimately make for slices of democracy being sacrificed.

These elements define the complexity and multidimensionality of the democracy crisis in LDCs. The better we grasp such examples, the theorization of democratic collapse and the possibilities of restoring it. ACETs and LDCs: Political Corruption and Agency IssueDemocratic crisis and root causes are intertwined. This often leads to unemployment

and poverty, which feeds resentment among the general population. When people feel that democratic systems cannot provide the necessities or improve the quality of life, they may lose faith in those systems. Dissatisfaction of this kind can ferment unrest or make autocratic alternatives more acceptable.

Education is how citizens learn about their rights and obligations in a democracy. Thus, crime, poverty, and economic disparity running rampant in many communities can directly be attributed to a lack of education that provides a critical examination of political issues, leading to low participation rates in such outcomes.

The disparity in the overall education infrastructure in LDCs and more developed countries leaves. Aside from the quality of education, many LDCs are underfunded and thus cannot provide quality education. However, they cannot watch over their leaders uncritically without informed and educated citizens, which leaves them to rot in times of political corruption. Corruption undermines democracy's trust as leaders use their office to enrich themselves instead of serving the common good. Such a self-reinforcing cycle could mitigate against democratic decay and give rise to, rather than eradicate, crises that would make responding to governments easier.

The jockeying of the democratic process in LDCs is also externally shaped by and through competition for external assistance, trade, and international political relations. "International support can be a vehicle for growth and economic stability" while ensuring dependence, which undermines government institutions; foreign intervention, whether military presence or economic sanctions, "can usurp democratic processes." In addition, where great powers focus on geopolitics, they prioritize their populations' interests and voices above those of other local populations, increasing the difficulty of contributing to democratic stability.

This complex issue can only be addressed with a multidimensional, political solution. This is especially true given the accelerating nature of the conflicts confronting governments today, and in preventing the causes of these conflicts, compounded levels of inequity and instability will create a climate hostile to democracy and democratic efforts at the national level. The ground foundation is that everyone should receive an education, and we should reform to make sure that quality education is available to everyone, especially civic education, which would ensure that individuals make educated decisions that impact their community and political processes.

At the same time, combating political corruption through transparency in governance and accountability mechanisms remains highly relevant. Governance reforms should focus on the rule of law and support civil society organizations that promote transparency. Similarly, externalities need a more systemic viewpoint, addressing fair trade and how international development organizations can invest in local governance and avoid undermining those systems.

This analysis calls for additional research that may yield avenues for strengthening democratic institutions in LDCs. Grasping these connections is necessary to build resilient democracies. For that resilience to last, we need to fight for their restoration and why they were lost in the first place. Policymakers must realize that some of these multifaceted challenges require coordinated actions and establishing political environments to spark inclusion.

### **Summary of the Discussions**

This includes a lack of education, access to external resources, economic instability, and more, which correlate with the extensive political corruption in nations commonly classified as LDCs, creating a feedback loop where each time you try to call democracy, it only gets subverted. However, commodity scarcity and market volatility cause economic instability and undermine confidence in public institutions, generating a process that, in turn, generates more instability. Citizens without knowledge cannot sufficiently contribute to civic institutions and are more easily manipulated, undermining democratic institutions. Functional corruption might change to malignant functional bribery and later into subsisting functional corruption to a monopoly of fear to inflexible political party rigidity.

The external environment, from foreign aid to the policies of international financial institutions, is also problematic, as it entrenches dependency and applies austerity measures that block the road to democracy. The case studies provide an excellent basis for comparative analysis and for identifying patterns and distinctions across cases of democratic decline, emphasizing the need for context-specific responses. The results of this study suggest that the principles of democratic crises in LDCs are complicated and need to be addressed using multiple facets that can combat democratic backsliding and indicate the call for an integrated methodology to build resilient, democratic institutions and engines of sustainable development in at-risk LDC states.

The paper highlights a web of interrelated determinants of democratic crises in LDCs. Political disorder, caused by insufficient resources and unstable economic conditions, causes poverty and unemployment, further dismantling faith in democracy. This is further pushed down to you as citizens are not given quality access to education, and therefore, they are easily tricked, and their ability to engage in the act of a well-informed democratic government is lost. Abuse of power for personal gain and political decay, of which corruption is a significant factor, is a major driver of social decay, which erodes public trust and confidence in democratic institutions.

A coup continues to threaten democracy in Gabon, and political institutions across much of Africa are problematic instability, corruption, and low citizen participation hinder the move toward Fuller democracies. An analysis of the cross-regional case studies reveals similarities and differences in pathways of democratic decline. Economic instability, lack of education, and political corruption are the root causes of democratic crises, and external influences heavily shape the path of democratic development.

The article also describes the complex nature of democratic crises in least-developed countries (LDCs), reflecting internal economic, social, and political processes and external factors. It leads to a key conclusion in fragile countries, especially the need for policies that target the causes of democracy's decline, including a whole-of-society policy framework that establishes the best possible conditions for democracy and society.

## CONCLUSION

This analysis reiterates the complexity and high dimensionality of democratic crises in LDCs, highlighting connections across factors such as economic crisis, education poverty, state malpractice, and foreign interventions. Economic instability erodes trust in public institutions and drives social unrest; a lack of education leads to declining civic participation and sets citizens up to be manipulated.» Political corruption undermines public confidence and trust in democratic governance, driving a vicious cycle of corruption and instability. Such problems are exacerbated due to dependence on foreign assistance and prescription by global financial institutions.

While this kind of comparative analysis in single case studies focuses on what is familiar and what is distinctive, as much as detailing the differences, this comparison also flags possible ways to stop or limit the decay, but also with an essential contextual caveat. These

findings reflect that the underlying causes of accelerating democratic deplorability must be addressed through comprehensive socioeconomic and educational planning, combating political corruption, and the need to build a fairer and more equitable world — for political stability to be restored. It allows policymakers to address these challenges holistically to cultivate resilient democracies that can respond to 21st-century complexities.

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